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MUCH ADO ABOUT (SCOTLAND IN) EUROPE
Daniel Kenealy
Abstract
The issue of an independent Scotland’s relationship with the European
Union (EU) has been one of the most contentious and recurring issues of the
referendum campaign. Discussion, to date, has been characterised by
competing assertions from the two sides of the campaign. There has been
little in the way of reasoned debate and consideration of the issue. Instead
it has become grist to the mill of two campaign meta-narratives, one
concerning the uncertainty inherent in a ‘Yes’ vote and the other concerning
the continuity and stability that Scotland would enjoy following a ‘Yes’ vote. In
this essay I will problematise the ofﬁcial position set out by the European
Commission, clarify some of the outstanding issues, and raise questions about
the proposed timescale for securing an independent Scotland’s continuing
membership of the EU. I argue that it would be in the interests of all parties, in
the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, to avoid a scenario in which Scotland found itself
outside of the EU and its legal framework for any period of time.
Keywords: European Union; European integration; SNP; Independence
campaign.
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1. Introduction
The issue of an independent Scotland’s relationship with the European Union
(EU) has been one of the most contentious and recurring issues of the
referendum campaign. In this essay I will trace the main contours of that
debate, making the following key arguments (For a more comprehensive
discussion of the issue see Kenealy, forthcoming; Kenealy and MacLennan,
forthcoming). First, the two sides of the debate have turned the EU issue into
grist to the mill of their chosen meta-narratives, one concerning stability and
the other concerning uncertainty. Second, ofﬁcial statements by senior EU
ﬁgures, whilst exhibiting consistency, have utterly failed to engage with the
deeply impractical scenario they would trigger if they came to fruition. Third,
irrespective of the legal basis on which the situation were to be resolved the
EU’s 28 Member States will each have to consent to a new, sovereign, nation
state joining their club. In other words, each will have a veto. Fourth,
negotiations seeking to secure an independent Scotland’s place within the EU
would be incredibly complex and the time between ‘Referendum Day’ and
‘Independence Day’ may not be sufﬁcient to reach a resolution. The possibility
of some form of bridging arrangement must therefore be taken seriously.
Overall the conclusion of this essay is that it would be in the best interests
of all existing EU Member States, and of an independent Scotland, to avoid a
scenario in which Scotland found itself outside of the EU and its legal
framework for any period of time. Such a scenario would invite any number of
practical difﬁculties that the EU would be best to avoid having to tackle. It
would also be deeply problematic, on normative grounds, for the EU as an
actor itself to exclude an independent Scotland – not to mention millions of
existing EU citizens – from a club that extolls the virtues of democracy as a by-
product of the exercise of a democratic right to self-determination. Thus for
both pragmatic and normative reasons it can be reasonably argued – although
no more than reasonably argued – that an independent Scotland would
transfer relatively seamlessly from part of an existing EU Member State (the
UK), to a Member State in its own right. However, and perhaps crucially for
the politics of the campaign, the issue of EU membership is not especially
salient for voters.
2. A convergence of views
In some respects the debate has come a long way. Consider that once, senior
ﬁgures within the SNP argued publicly that membership of the EU for an
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independent Scotland would be ‘automatic’ (Nicola Sturgeon in Scottish
Parliament, 2007). The claim of automaticity was always a murky one and, in a
2007 document, the (then) Scottish Executive more cryptically stated ‘an
independent Scotland would continue in the European Union . . . following
negotiations on the detailed terms of membership’ (Scottish Executive,
2007: 23). In the 2009 manifesto similarly the claim was that membership
would continue but that negotiations on such housekeeping matters as the
number of MEPs and voting weight in the Council of Ministers would be
required. (Scottish Government, 2009: 110). Therefore, recognition of some
form of negotiation goes back to at least 2007. Since adopting the idea of
‘Independence in Europe’ in 1988, the argument that EU membership would
be effectively automatic has been important to the SNP. ‘Independence
in Europe’ was an idea embraced for ‘largely pragmatic’ reasons (Hepburn,
2009: 193), with the (then) European Communities cast as a welcoming and
familiar international society in which an independent Scotland would be
embedded (Lynch, 1996: 39). It was far from certain, given the history of the
SNP’s attitude towards European integration, that such an idea would be
embraced, yet it has remained a ﬁrm plank of SNP policy for over a quarter of
a century (for a comprehensive discussion see Mitchell, 1998: and Hepburn,
2009). In February 2013, with the issue ﬁrmly in the public gaze, Nicola
Sturgeon delivered a speech in Brussels, which made it clear that the SNP
recognised that negotiations would be required to secure EU membership for
an independent Scotland, and that there was nothing automatic about the
process.1 It was taken by some to be a signiﬁcant U-turn on the issue but, in
reality, the SNP’s at times vague and loose choice of words over the preceding
years always made it difﬁcult to ﬁrmly establish what their position was
(Gardham, 2013).
Sturgeon’s February 2013 speech came on the back on an intense period of
activity in which the question of an independent Scotland’s EU membership
had been especially controversial. The closing months of 2012 saw the First
Minister, Alex Salmond, embroiled in a controversy concerning legal advice
received by the Scottish Government on the issue of EU membership.
Salmond appointed Sir David Bell to carry out an independent inquiry into
whether the Ministerial Code had been breached (Carrell, 2012; Johnson,
2012a, 2012b). By January 2013 Salmond had been cleared of intentionally
misleading the public on the issue of EU legal advice, although he was
criticised for giving ‘muddled’ responses.2 Around the same time, in December
2012, the European Commission president, Jose´ Manuel Barroso, waded into
the debate in the form of a letter written to the House of Lords Economic
Affairs Committee, a matter to which the essay returns in the next section.
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The UK Government has also moved some distance on this issue. In late
2011 UK Government legal advice, arguing that an independent Scotland
would have to apply to the EU from scratch and would have to adopt the euro,
was leaked (Johnson, 2011). In February 2013 the UK Government published
its ﬁrst Scotland Analysis document, which considered the issue of EU
membership within an annex concerning the international law aspects of
independence. Two noted international lawyers (although not EU experts),
James Crawford and Alan Boyle, acknowledged that it was not ‘inconceivable
for Scotland automatically to be a EU member’. They went on: ‘the relevant EU
organs or Member States might be willing to adjust the usual requirements for
membership in the circumstances of Scotland’s case. But that would be a
decision for them, probably made on the basis of negotiations’ (UK
Government, 2013: 67). In a further Scotland Analysis paper, published in
February 2014 and focused more directly on EU issues, the UK Government
stated that ‘there is a strong case that it [Scotland] would have to go through
some form of accession process to become a member of the EU. It would also
have to enter negotiations on the terms of its membership’ (UK Government,
2014: 7).
There has thus been something of a convergence in views. Both the UK
Government and the Scottish Government are in broad agreement that a set
of complex negotiations would be required. They are distinguishable
principally on two issues: ﬁrstly, on what legal basis Scotland might secure
membership of the EU and, secondly, on their degree of optimism about
whether Scotland will be able to achieve membership quickly and with the
opt-outs and special provisions currently enjoyed by the UK. Ultimately,
however both sides have used the EU issue as grist to the mill of their chosen
metanarratives (for an extended discussion see Jeffery, 2014). For the pro-
independence side the EU is – along with the pound sterling, the Queen, the
various other forms of shared assets that the SNP claim will be retained – one
of the many structures in which an independent Scotland will continue to be
embedded. It thus serves as a symbol of continuity. For the pro-union side the
EU issue represents little more than another element of uncertainty and risk in
a ‘Yes’ vote. The issue has been caught up in these two metanarratives and is
often reduced to little more than a clash of competing statements.
3. A problematic ofﬁcial position
Senior European Union ofﬁcials who have weighed in on the issue
have certainly provided more comfort to the pro-union side than the
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pro-independence side. The European Commission, speaking through its
president, has adopted a clear stance on the issue dating back to 2004:
‘If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of
that state because it were to become a new independent state, the
[EU] Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a
new independent state would, by the fact of its independence,
become a third country with respect to the EU.’ (Prodi, 2004. See also
Barroso, 2012 and Johnson, 2013)
The position suggests that Scotland would remain part of the EU until the
moment of its independence and then, at that moment, would cease to be so.
It would then be possible for a newly independent Scotland to approach the
EU and apply for membership in the same way as any other state wishing to
join. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) would govern this
process.
The position of European Commission is problematic in several ways. First,
it is not for the Commission to decide this issue. If the issue is one of accession
then it is for the Member States, in the Council, to determine the outcome.
The Commission’s role in that process is advisory and conﬁned to the technical
process of ensuring that various requirements of membership are met.
Second, and more signiﬁcantly, the position invites the chaos of creating a hole
in the EU single market. In the words of Sir David Edward, a former UK judge
of the European Court of Justice, there would be a midnight hour at which the
legal framework of the EU would cease to apply to the territory of Scotland,
territory that had been within that framework for over four decades (Edward,
2012, 2013). What this would mean in practice is difﬁcult to fully grasp but it
would have the potential to alter the status of every national of a EU Member
State currently living in Scotland and it would leave any Scottish nationals
living and working throughout the EU in legal limbo. As Sir David pointed out,
Scotland’s territorial waters would move outside of the EU and the common
ﬁsheries policy would cease to apply (perhaps a welcome beneﬁt for some
areas of Scotland heavily dependent on ﬁshing, but likely not to other
Member States with signiﬁcant ﬁshing industries).
The underlying point is clear. The interdependencies that an institution like
the EU creates, and the reciprocal rights and obligations that it creates, mean
that the expulsion of any part of its existing territory carries with it negative
risks for all other Member States. You cannot surgically remove one part of the
market without sending very disruptive ripple effects throughout the entire
market. The Member States recognised this when, through the Lisbon Treaty,
they corrected an oversight and added a legal provision dealing with how a
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Member State might leave the EU. Article 50 TEU makes it clear than the
Treaty does not permit immediate withdrawal (for a discussion of Article 50
see Hofmeister, 2010). Any departure can occur only after a carefully
negotiated settlement that includes a requirement to ‘take account of the
framework for its [the departing Member State’s] future relationship with the
Union’. Implicit within Article 50 is recognition that immediate departure from
the EU would be disruptive and deeply impractical. Whilst no speciﬁc Treaty
article deals with the precise scenario that an independent Scotland would
present it is fair to conclude that the framers of that Treaty cannot have
‘reasonably intended that there must be prior negotiation in the case of
withdrawal but none in the case of separation’ (Edward, 2012).
The Commission itself, tasked with preserving the integrity of the single
market and refraining from any actions that would threaten it, might even be
in dereliction of duty in advocating its current stance. It certainly cuts against
the EU’s commitment to the general principles of good faith, democracy
and self-determination (see Articles 2 and 4 TEU), not to mention the notion
of the EU as a normative power in the world, a power that derives much
of its inﬂuence from what it is, what it represents, and how it operates
(The concept of Normative Power Europe is well-established in the EU studies
literature – see Manners, 2002). Excluding territory and millions of individual
citizens because they exercise a democratic right to self-determination is, as
SNP leaders have been eager to point out, somewhat contradictory with the
spirit of the club.
4. Everybody gets a say on who joins the club
If Barroso’s comments have done anything they have served to highlight the
so-called ‘Article 49 versus Article 48’ debate. In essence this debate concerns
the precise legal route through which an independent Scotland might attain
EU membership. The Commission (and Herman Van Rompuy, the President
of the European Council) have identiﬁed Article 49 as the appropriate
route. This is, as stated above, the article dealing with the accession of new
states. The Scottish Government, in its White Paper and supplementary
document on the EU, argue that an amendment to the existing Treaties would
be sufﬁcient to grant Scotland membership of the EU as an independent state
(Scottish Government 2013a, 2013b). Article 48 TEU could thus be used and
this would, the Scottish Government believe, expedite the process of securing
membership. This belief is certainly open to challenge, both on legal grounds
and on the grounds that it would be a more expeditious.
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Legally, the balance of evidence presented to date suggests that Article 49
would be the more appropriate route (see, for example, Armstrong, 2013;
Piris, 2014; Scottish Parliament, 2014). However the issue of ‘which Article’ is
of more interest to EU lawyers than it is to those who are trying to reason
through this scenario in a practical and policy-oriented way. Far more than the
law it is the politics that will determine the outcome of this particular
situation. If the political will exists to ﬁnd a solution then one legal
mechanism, or the other, can be plausibly employed to attain a politically
agreed goal.
The biggest strike against the Article 48 route, as proposed by the Scottish
Government, is that it might actually extend the amount of time required to
secure membership. Anybody familiar with the history of the EU knows
Member States are often reluctant to open up the Treaties as to do so is
potentially pulling at a thread that can quickly untangle a complex set of
different national desires and interests. In short, it may be unpalatable for
Member States to put Treaty change on the agenda to facilitate Scottish
membership for fear that the process would be hijacked by other Member
States seeking changes elsewhere in the Treaty. Furthermore, the
appropriateness of Article 48 does remain legally debatable. Should another
Member State feel that an inappropriate Treaty base is being employed to
attain the goal of membership for a new state then a challenge could be
brought before the European Court of Justice and this would only serve to
lengthen the process.
Whichever route is taken the reality is that all existing EU Member States
will have to agree to Scotland becoming a member in its own right, and the
terms of that membership. Both accession (Article 49) and treaty amendment
(Article 48) require a unanimous vote in the Council, followed by ratiﬁcation
processes in each of the Member States. This raises the spectre of a Spanish
veto, a possibility oft-remarked upon in discussion of this issue to date. Whilst
it is reasonable to infer that the Spanish Government has an interest in
ensuring that Scotland votes ‘No’ – given the strength of the independence
movement in Catalonia – there has been no suggestion, to date, that a
Spanish veto would be played (At the time of writing the most recent
intervention by Spanish Government ofﬁcials was in early February 2014. The
Spanish foreign minister did not suggest that Spain would veto, but did point
out that the process of securing membership for an independent Scotland
would be difﬁcult and protracted; see Scotsman, 2014.) The Spanish
Government has been clear that it sees the Scottish situation as setting no
precedent for Spain, given the differences between the UK and Spanish
constitutional set up. It is also important to remember that Spain is a state
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with a number of different interests. It is unwise to assess the Spanish
Government’s response to Scottish independence on a single metric, namely
what it means for ‘the Catalan question’. There are other interests at stake
(ﬁsheries being the most obvious example) and they must be considered in
the interests of reaching a balanced judgment.
More important than any possible veto of the process is when the process
of dealing with an independent Scotland can actually begin. If Article 49 is
read literally then Scotland will have to wait until the moment of its
independence to apply for EU membership.3 That is to invite the nightmare
scenario of the sudden and sharp dislocation to the single market. A relaxed
interpretation of Article 49, or alternatively the Article 48 route, might allow
for negotiations to begin shortly after a ‘Yes’ vote with the UK Government
as a party alongside a team representing the nascent Scottish state and
possessing delegated authority from London. However, even if negotiations
can commence quickly following a ‘Yes’ vote, the timetable of eighteen
months remains challenging.
5. A tight timetable
Whilst it is true that Scotland already complies with the majority of the acquis
communautaire (the combined body of EU law) there would remain work to
do to ensure that an independent Scotland was ready to assume all of the
responsibilities of full EU membership. Many of the regulatory responsibilities
that EU Member States must meet are currently exercised, on behalf of
Scotland, by UK institutions. The EU Commission and the other Member States
would have to satisfy themselves that an independent Scotland had put in
place the necessary regulatory structures and agencies necessary to ‘speak’ to
Brussels. Many issues will have to be resolved between Scotland and the UK
before they can be resolved between Scotland and the EU.When you consider
that each Member State will then have to ratify the treaty that brings Scotland
within the EU – whether an accession treaty or a treaty amendment – then
eighteen months begins to seem ambitious.4
Negotiations will no doubt be made more contentious by the fact that the
Scottish Government is seeking so-called ‘continuity of effect’ (Scottish
Government, 2013b: 12, 87–8). Essentially, this means that an independent
Scotland would retain all of the current opt-outs and special provisions that
the UK currently possesses. Some of these opt-outs relate to sensitive issues
such as membership of the euro and the Schengen Area. Without inheriting
such opt-outs there would be a legal obligation on Scotland to make progress
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towards joining both. The reality however is more complex. No state can
be compelled to join the euro and Sweden is notable as an example of a
state that has simply refused to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM-II), thus failing to meet one of the convergence criteria (for a fuller
discussion see Scott, 2012). Membership of the Schengen Area, similarly,
requires strict criteria to be met and unanimous agreement from all existing
members.
More interesting than the question of whether an independent Scotland
might be able to negotiate these opt-outs for itself – and again, that will be
a function of the political interests of the other Member States – is the
broader question of what type of EU Member State it might wish to be? By
setting out a stall in favour of ‘continuity of effect’ the Scottish Government is
signalling, as Michael Keating has put it, that it wishes ‘to cling to the rest of a
United Kingdom that seems to be moving away from, if not altogether out
of’ the EU (Scottish Parliament, 2013: Col. 1555). Absent from the White
Paper and supplementary document is a positive vision of an independent
Scotland in the EU. Almost certainly, in the short-to-medium term there is no
realistic prospect of an independent Scotland adopting the euro or gaining
membership of the Schengen Area. It seems certain that, in the years ahead,
an independent Scotland would have to choose whether to move towards the
core of the EU, or remain with the UK on the periphery.
6. Conclusion
In the ﬁnal analysis perhaps the most that can be said is this: in the event
of a ‘Yes’ vote in September there will be tremendous pressure on all
EU Member States to avoid a sudden and sharp dislocation to the
single market. That pressure ought to concentrate minds and lead to
negotiations between ‘Referendum Day’ and ‘Independence Day’. The
outcome of those negotiations will be a function of a set of political
interests held by the 28 Member States, and also by the manner in which
Scotland approaches its European partners. Despite the intermittent
controversy sparked by this issue it remains a low salience issue for
voters in the referendum (Eichhorn and Kenealy, 2014). As the two sides –
pro-independence and pro-union – trade barbs about what would happen to
an independent Scotland vis-a`-vis the EU, the voters seem to be shrugging
their shoulders at an issue that is neither particularly important to them in
making up their minds, nor a subject about which much more clarity can be
expected ahead of September.
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Notes
1. Nicola Sturgeon, Speech to the European Policies Centre, Brussels, 26 February
2013, available at http://www.scotreferendum.com/2013/02/speech-to-european-
policy-centre-in-brussels-26-february-2013.
2. Sir David Bell, ‘Scottish Ministerial Code: Complaint by Catherine Stihler
MSP’, 7 January 2013, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/
00412247.pdf.
3. Article 49 TEU reads: ‘any European state . . . may apply to become a member of the
Union’. Read literally Scotland would not be a European state until ‘Independence
Day’ but it would be far more pragmatic to recognise Scotland as a European state
in embryonic form following a ‘Yes’ vote.
4. The most rapid completion of the accession process to date was the 1995
enlargement, which brought Austria, Finland, and Sweden into the EU. Negotiations
were completed in thirteen months with ratiﬁcation taking a further ten months.
See Sedelmeier, 2010: 404–5.
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